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Abstract
In an interesting recent paper, Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) extended
Tullocks (1980) rent-seeking game with an entry decision. The mixed strate-
gies identied by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi for the case of increasing returns
in the contest success function (r > 2) do not constitute an equilibrium of
the game they study. However, these strategies are an equilibrium if the
strategy space of the game is restricted by a minimum expenditure require-
ment, and this minimum expenditure requirement is an element of a specic
interval.
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1 Introduction
In an interesting recent paper, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Francesco Parisi
(2005) reconsidered Gordon Tullocks (1980) rent-seeking game.1 They introduce
an exit option and propose a mixed strategy equilibrium for the case of increasing
returns in the contest success function (r > 2): Each player mixes between two
strategies: nonparticipation, and participation with one uniquely dened positive
level of investment in rent-seeking activities.
This note shows that these strategies do not constitute an equilibrium of the
game specied by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005). However, these strategies
do constitute an equilibrium if the strategy space is restricted by a minimum
expenditure requirement, and this minimum expenditure requirement is an element
of a specic interval.
Minimum expenditure requirements in rent-seeking contests have been stud-
ied by Hillman and Samet (1987), Yang (1993), and Schoonbeeck and Kooreman
(1997). Hillman and Samet (1987) study a perfectly discriminating contest, where
the player who chooses the highest investment in rent-seeking wins with certainty.
Yang (1993) studies a Dollar-Auction between two players with alternating moves.
Schoonbeeck and Kooreman (1997) consider Tullocks rent-seeking game with two
players and r = 1:
The assumption of a minimum expenditure requirement captures the fact that,
in reality, it is often necessary to invest at least a certain minimum amount in
rent-seeking activities in order to have some impact at all. For example, Yang
(1993) argues that a lobby group that wants to inuence a government has to
articulate its aims to the public to some extend, for otherwise the government
will not take the lobby group seriously. Another example is given by Schoonbeeck
and Kooreman (1997), who point out that, in the Netherlands, political parties
have to pay an entry fee before they can participate in an election contest for the
parliament or the municipal councils.
1This game has received a considerable amount of scholarly attention, see Lockard and Tullock
(2000) for a collection of important papers.
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2 The Unrestricted Tullock Contest With an En-
try Decision
This section lays out the game introduced by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005),
which I call the Unrestricted Tullock Contest With an Entry Decision. The word
unrestrictedrefers to the assumption that the strategy space is not restricted by
a minimum expenditure requirement. Two risk neutral players (a and b) compete
for a rent. The size of the rent is normalized to one. Let xi denote the strategy
of player i. Usually, the strategy space in Tullocks rent seeking game is the set of
nonnegative real numbers. Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) allow players an exit
option: players simultaneously decide whether to participate or not, and in case
of participation, how much to invest in rent-seeking activities. Thus, I take it that
the strategy space is [0;1) [ fNg ; with the interpretation that xi = N means
that i does not participate, and xi = x 2 [0;1) means that i participates with an
investment equal to x:
The payo¤ of player i = a; b is as follows:
Si =
8>>>><>>>>:
0; if xi = N;
xri
xri+xj
r   xi; if xi; xj 2 [0;1) and xri + xjr 6= 0;
1
2
; if xi = xj = 0;
1  xi; if xi 2 [0;1) and xj = N:
(1)
The rst line in equation (1) says that a player who does not participate gets a
payo¤ of zero. The second line describes the case where both players participate,
and at least one of the investments in rent-seeking activities is strictly positive.
Player a gets the share xra= (xa
r + xb
r) of the rent, and b gets the remainder; both
players have to bear the cost of their investment in rent-seeking activities. I will
concentrate on the case where r > 2: The third line takes care of the situation where
both players participate with an investment of zero: in that case, players share the
rent equally.2 Finally, the fourth line says that if only one player participates, he
2This assumption is often used in the literature, see e. g. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries
(1994). Alternatively one could assume that no one gets the rent if xa = xb = 0. This is also
sometimes assumed in the literature, see e. g. Yang (1994). Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005)
do not state what they assume for the case that both players participate with an investment of
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gets all the rent, but has to pay the cost of his investment.3
The game is a simultaneous move one-shot game. This is in contrast to Higgins,
Shughart, and Tollison (1985) who considered a two stage rent-seeking game with
endogenous participation where players announce their participation decision in a
rst stage, and those who participate decide on their investment in rent-seeking
after observing the number of active competitors in a second stage.4
3 The Restricted Tullock Contest With an Entry
Decision
In order to highlight the role of a minimum expenditure requirement, I now in-
troduce the Restricted Tullock Contest With an Entry Decision. In this game the
strategy space is restricted by a minimum expenditure requirement: a player has to
invest at least z > 0 if he participates. Thus, the strategy space is [z;1)[ fNg :5
Otherwise, the specication of the game is as in the Unrestricted Tullock Contest
With an Entry Decision.
4 The proposed strategies
Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) propose a mixed strategy equilibrium where each
player mixes between two strategies: nonparticipation, and participation with one
uniquely dened positive level of investment in rent-seeking activities. To analyze
this, I follow their notation: A (B) denotes the probability that player a (b) par-
ticipates, and A (B) denotes the investment of player a (b) in case of participation.
zero. However, my results do not depend on which assumption is taken - in fact the proofs go
through without modication under both assumptions.
3The formulation above di¤erentiates between nonparticipation and an investment of zero.
An alternative interpretation of Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) would be to take an investment
of zero as equivalent to nonparticipation. In that case, the strategy space is [0;1) : The payo¤
of player i is x
r
i
xri+xj
r   xi if xi > 0, and zero if xi = 0. My comment does not depend on which
interpretation is adopted - I take care to formulate all the results and proofs such that they go
through under both interpretations.
4See also Corcoran (1984) and Corcoran and Karels (1985).
5Under the alternative interpretation of Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) described in footnote
3, the strategy space of the restricted game is [z;1) [ f0g :
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Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005: 417) propose the following mixed strategies:
players participate with probability
A = 

B =
4
2 + r
; (2)
and, in case of participation, investments in rent-seeking equal
A = B =
r
2 + r
: (3)
To see the logic behind this, consider the expected payo¤ of player a; given
that he participates and b mixes between nonparticipation and investing B (Dari-
Mattiacci and Parisi 2005: 416):
SA (A jB; B ) = B

Ar
Ar +Br
  A

+ (1  B) (1  A) : (4)
Inserting B and B
;
SA (A jB; B ) =
4
2 + r
 
Ar
Ar +
 
r
2+r
r   A
!
+

1  4
2 + r

(1  A) : (5)
It is straightforward to calculate that SA (A jB; B ) = 0: That is, participat-
ing and investing A results in an expected payo¤ of zero. Nonparticipation also
results in a payo¤ of zero. Hence player a is indi¤erent between nonparticipation
and participation with an investment of A:
Moreover, SA (A jB; B ) has a local maximum at A. To see this, di¤erentiate
line (4):
@SA (A jB; B )
@A
= B
rBrAr 1
(Ar +Br)2
  1; (6)
@2SA (A jB; B )
@A2
=
BrB
rAr 2
(Ar +Br)3
((Ar +Br) (r   1)  2rAr) : (7)
5
Inserting A; B; and B leads to
@SA (A
 jB; B )
@A
= 0;
@2SA (A
 jB; B )
@A2
< 0:
Thus, at A the relevant local rst- and second-order conditions hold.
However, given r > 2; it follows from equation (7) that SA (A jB; B ) is strictly
convex in A i¤
A < A0 := B


r   1
r + 1
 1
r
; (8)
and strictly concave i¤A > A0. Thus, local rst- and second order conditions may
not be su¢ cient to characterize the global maximum.6
In fact, this is the case in the Unrestricted Tullock Contest With an Entry
Decision. Without a minimum expenditure requirement, a player could participate
and invest a very small amount. In this way, his costs are negligible. He still gets
the rent in case that the opponent stays out, which happens with strictly positive
probability. Thus, if player a participates with a su¢ ciently small investment, he
gets a strictly positive payo¤.
Remark 1 The strategies described in equations (2) and (3), where the players
mix between nonparticipation on the one hand, and investing a specic amount in
rent-seeking activities on the other, do not constitute a Nash equilibrium of the
Unrestricted Tullock Contest With an Entry Decision.
Proof. Suppose player b behaves according to equations (2) and (3). If a also
follows (2) and (3), he gets a payo¤ of zero. However, a s payo¤ SA (A jB; B )
gets arbitrarily close to 1   B > 0 by choosing a small enough A > 0: Hence
participating with a su¢ ciently small investment is strictly better than staying
out, or investing A.
As an example, Figure 1 plots SA (A jB; B ) (given in equation (5) above) as
a function of A; assuming r = 3:
6This point is similar to Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1994, p. 367).
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Figure 1: SA (A jB; B ) as a function of A; assuming r = 3: Here,
A = r= (2 + r) = 0:6 and 1  B = (r   2) = (r + 2) = 0:2
5 The role of the minimum expenditure require-
ment
For the case r = 3; Figure 1 clearly shows that the strategies (2) and (3) are
not an equilibrium of the Unrestricted Tullock Contest with an Entry Decision.
However, Figure 1 also indicates that these strategies are an equilibrium if there
is a su¢ ciently high minimum expenditure requirement. For example, z = 0:3 will
do.
The main result of this note is that these points generalize for all r > 2. Lemma
1 denes the appropriate critical level of the minimum expenditure requirement,
and Proposition 1 states the result formally.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique A^ 2 (0; r= (2 + r)) such that
SA

A^ jB; B

= 0: (9)
7
Moreover, SA (A jB; B ) > 0 for all A 2

0; A^

; and SA (A jB; B ) < 0 for all
A 2

A^;1

n fr= (2 + r)g.
Proof. It has been shown in Section 4 that SA (A jB; B ) has a local maxi-
mum at A = r= (2 + r) ; and SA (A jB; B ) = 0: Thus there exists an " > 0
such that SA (A jB; B ) < 0 for all A 2 (A   "; A) : On the other hand,
limA#0 SA (A jB; B ) = (r   2) = (2 + r) > 0. Since SA (A jB; B ) is continuous,
it follows that there is at least one A^ 2 (0; A) such that (9) holds.
Next, I show that A^ is unique. Since SA (A jB; B ) is strictly concave for
all A > A0; and SA (A jB; B ) = 0; it follows that SA (A jB; B ) < 0 for
all A 2 [A0; A) : In addition, SA (A jB; B ) is strictly convex for A 2 (0; A0) :
Hence A^ is unique. It follows that SA (A jB; B ) > 0 for all A 2

0; A^

; and
SA (A jB; B ) < 0 for all A 2

A^;1

n fr= (2 + r)g.
Proposition 1 Consider the Restricted Tullock Contest With an Entry Decision,
with two contestants and r > 2. The strategies described in equations (2) and (3),
where the players mix between nonparticipation on the one hand, and investing a
specic amount in rent-seeking activities on the other, constitute a Nash equilib-
rium if and only if the minimum expenditure requirement z satises
z 2

A^;
r
2 + r

:
Proof. If z < A^; then participating and investing A = z gives player a a strictly
positive payo¤ by Lemma 1, contradicting equilibrium. If z 2
h
A^; r= (2 + r)
i
; it
follows from Lemma 1 that no protable deviation from the strategies (2) and (3)
exists. A similar argument shows that player b has no incentive to deviate, either.
Finally, if z > r= (2 + r) ; investing A = r= (2 + r) is not feasible.
6 Conclusion
Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) propose a mixed strategy equilibrium for Tul-
locks rent-seeking contest with an exit option and r > 2: Each player mixes
8
between two strategies: nonparticipation, and participation with one uniquely de-
ned positive level of investment in rent-seeking activities. This note shows that
these strategies do not constitute an equilibrium of the game studied by Dari-
Mattiacci and Parisi (2005). However, they do constitute an equilibrium if the
strategy space is restricted by a minimum expenditure requirement, and this min-
imum expenditure requirement lies in a specic interval.
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